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Abstract
This paper investigates international differences in wage inequality and skills and
whether a compressed wage distribution is associated with high unemployment
across core OECD countries. Wage dispersion and wage structure are widely debated
among policymakers; compressed wage structure is often perceived as an important
cause of high unemployment. Firstly, this paper examines differences in wage
dispersion across OECD countries and their link to skill dispersion. Some countries
that have more compressed (dispersed) wage structures simultaneously have more
compressed (dispersed) skill structures as well, and skill differences explain part of
the differences in wage dispersion. However, even when accounted for skills, some
countries have a more compressed wage structure, most likely caused by labor
market institutions. We do not find an effect of wage compression on the labor
market performance in the low-skill sector. Based on the Program for International
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) survey of adult skills for core OECD
countries, this paper cannot confirm the skill compression nor wage compression
hypotheses. Rather than insisting on the deregulation of labor market institutions
and reductions in public welfare policy as the main policy recommendations to
achieve higher employment (and higher wage inequality), policymakers should
reconsider aggregate demand deficiency and the variation in macroeconomic
policies as potential explanations for the employment differences across countries.
JEL Classification: J31, J24, E24
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1 Introduction
The variation in wage inequality across developed countries has puzzled economists
for many years, and different theoretical explanations and empirical evidence have
been presented on this issue. Some economists argue that these differences can be ex-
plained by supply and demand factors, whereas others emphasize the influence of
wage-setting institutions on the wage structure. Consistent with the first theory, the
variations in wage inequality across different countries can be explained by variations
in skill inequalities. Countries that have more compressed (dispersed) wage structures
simultaneously have more compressed (dispersed) skill structures as well (Nickell and
Bell 1995;1 Leuven et al. 2004). According to neoclassical theory, supply and demand
factors, skill-biased technical change (SBTC), and globalization are responsible for the
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increase in wage inequality in the past decades (Katz and Murphy 1992; Juhn et al.
1993; Katz and Autor 1999; Goldin and Katz 2008; Acemoglu and Autor 2012) and
market forces play a more significant role in explaining cross-national differences in
wage inequality and return to skill than institutional factors (Gottschalk and Joyce
1998). Since the Anglo-Saxon countries had simultaneously higher wage and skill in-
equalities compared to continental and Nordic Europe, this was taken as proof of the
theory. The reasoning behind this theory is that higher wage inequality is a conse-
quence of higher return to skills. A high skill premium goes along with increased mo-
tivation to invest in skill formation (Heckman et al. 1998; Welch 1999) and,
consequently, greater supply of highly skilled labor. This explanation, however, fails to
explain the high educational attainment in Nordic countries, which exhibit among the
lowest rates of wage inequality when compared to other developed countries. Alternative
explanation for variation in wage dispersion is based on the variation in wage-setting insti-
tutions. Economists who are in favor of this hypothesis stress the importance of de-
creasing real minimum wages and union membership in order to explain the
widening wage gap (Freeman 1991; Freeman and Katz 1994; Blau and Kahn 1996;
Bach et al. 2007; Machin 2016). A similar conclusion comes from Dew-Becker and
Gordon (2005, 2008), who, in addition to these explanations, identify peer-group
behavior as responsible for increasing wage dispersion at the top of the distribution in
the USA. Card and DiNardo (2002) reach similar conclusions and also criticize the
skill-biased technical change argument as being unable to account for gender and
racial wage inequalities and differences in return to education.
Variation in wage inequality in the bottom half of the wage distribution is also often
linked to variation in employment in the low-skill sector. According to neoclassical
theory, differences in wage dispersion are often credited as an important explanation
for differences in unemployment rates. Whereas dispersed wage structure can con-
tribute to employment creation, wage compression in the bottom half of the wage dis-
tribution (usually assumed by labor market institutions) can cause unemployment in
the low-skill sector (Siebert 1997; Heckman and Jacobs 2010). Due to the skill-biased
technical change, relative demand for low-skilled workers in developed countries ex-
hibited a decline; their relative marginal productivity deteriorated (relative marginal
productivity of skilled workers rose). However, wage compression and excessively
high wages (higher than marginal productivity) at the low end of the wage distribu-
tion cut low-skilled workers out of employment. Consequently, countries should
allow for higher wage dispersion in the bottom half of the wage distribution and lower
wages for the low skilled (institutional reform) which should push their employment
levels up. This is in line with a trade-off between efficiency and equality (Okun 1975),
according to which it is impossible to achieve high employment and low inequality at
the same time. In order to achieve high employment, countries must accept high
wage dispersion. By comparing the distribution of wages and employment in
Germany and the USA, Siebert (1997) concludes that the relevant policy recommen-
dation to increase employment in Germany at the low end is to allow for dispersed
wage structure (higher wage inequality).
High and increasing wage inequality as well as high unemployment in some OECD
countries shifted the focus of policymakers to differences in wage dispersion. This
paper discusses theoretical and empirical backgrounds of wage compression hypothesis.
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The wage compression hypothesis is based on the perfect market model and its rigid
assumptions. However, many of these assumptions are flawed—as the empirical analysis
of this paper shows. Cross-country differences in wage dispersion cannot be explained
by cross-country differences in skill dispersion; educational attainment does not seem
to be higher in countries where return to schooling is high, and there is wage disper-
sion within skill levels, which is in stark contrast with marginal productivity theory.
These arguments are in contrast with theoretical foundations of the wage compression
hypothesis. Finally, unemployment/e-pops/average hours worked are not correlated
with compressed wages. Thus, this paper shows that the wage compression hypothesis
is not supported by empirical evidence and therefore challenges the theoretical assump-
tions it is derived from. The results of this study (although descriptive) have some
important consequences for policy-making. Recommended policies for eliminating
wage compression, and allowing for higher wage dispersion, are the deregulation of
labor market institutions (collective bargaining, unemployment benefits, unions, mini-
mum wages, etc.) and a reduction of public welfare policies. However, since wage com-
pression is not correlated with labor market performance in the low-skilled sector
(contrary to the theory), these policy recommendations need to be revised. More-
over, higher wage dispersion is related to major social and health problems, as well
as the higher share of low-paid jobs. This study shows that countries that have
good labor market performance in the low-skill sector have good labor market per-
formance in general and this is likely due to macroeconomic policies. Conse-
quently, the role of expansionary macroeconomic policies in fostering employment
needs to be revisited.
The analysis presented in this paper extends the existing literature by examining
these issues. This paper shares the most similarities with the work of Freeman and
Schettkat (2001) and Devroye and Freeman (2001). Freeman and Schettkat (2001)
examine the wage compression hypothesis based on differences between the USA
and Germany in relation to employment. They find that skill compression can only
partly explain wage compression. However, the wage compression hypothesis can-
not explain the US-German difference in employment. Devroye and Freeman
(2001) study the relationship between the distribution of earnings and the distribu-
tion of skills and find that skill inequality explains only 7% of wage inequality.
Within-skill-group inequality plays a larger role than inequality between skill
groups; this contradicts the theory. In contrast to the first two studies that were
based on the international literacy survey in the 1990s (International Adult Literacy
Survey—IALS), in this paper, a more recent data set is used, with a larger number
of countries and larger sample sizes. It is important to check whether the results
based on the IALS survey can be confirmed by using the Program for International
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the data set and data adjust-
ments are presented in more detail. This section is followed by the empirical ana-
lysis in Sections 3 and 4. Firstly, international differences in skill levels, wage
inequality, and the relationship between skill inequality and wage inequality are
examined. In Section 5, the dispersion of wages within skill levels is investigated.
Section 6 analyzes the wage compression hypothesis and its effect on employment.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Jovicic IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:21 Page 3 of 26
2 Data description
This analysis is based on the PIAAC data set that was collected between 2011 and 2012
and initiated by the OECD. PIAAC is a unique data set that provides numerous oppor-
tunities for research, because it comprises various individual-level indicators of skill
competencies, earnings, demographic, and socio-economic characteristics and other
internationally comparable information across OECD countries. Since countries’
sample sizes are bigger than in previous similar data sets (around 5000 observa-
tions per country), such a sample facilitates more comprehensive analysis and
better investigation of different subgroups. People were questioned on the basis of
a 1.5–2-h interview, which was performed by a specially trained interviewer (tests
were done either on computer or on paper). The adult competency skills are mea-
sured by literacy, numeracy, and problem solving in technology-rich environments2
that are central for good performance in the labor market. That is why the skills
tested in the survey should be a good proxy for the skills needed in the workplace.
According to the test score results, six different proficiency levels are defined. The
pooled data set used in this paper contains national representative samples of
around 120,000 observations based on working age populations (16–65) from 16
different highly developed core OECD countries. Countries included in the data set
are Austria, Belgium3 (Flanders), Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany4,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain (England
and Northern Ireland), and the USA.5
The definition of the PIAAC literacy test is as follows: “understanding, evaluating,
using, and engaging with written text to participate in society, to achieve one’s goals,
and to develop one’s knowledge and potential.” Numeracy assessment is defined as the
ability to access, use, interpret, and communicate mathematical information and ideas
and to engage in and manage mathematical demands of a range of situations in adult
life. Finally, problem solving accounts for “using digital technology, communication
tools, and networks to acquire and evaluate information, communicate with others,
and perform practical tasks” (OECD 2013a:59).
The correlation coefficient between different test results is slightly lower than in
previous test surveys (ALL or IALS) but is still highly positive. The correlation co-
efficient between numeracy and literacy scores is the highest and equals to 0.89,
followed by the correlation coefficient between literacy scores and problem-solving
skills (0.79). The smallest correlation coefficient is found between numeracy scores
and problem-solving scores in technology-rich environments (0.75). In this analysis,
numeracy test scores are used as a measure of skill test results,6 which is standard
in this literature, but further analysis actually showed that the same results are
confirmed when literacy test scores are used.7 For further analysis, it is vital to
compare the wage data from the micro data set—the PIAAC survey with the
macro data from the OECD database. Figure 1 displays wage inequality taken from
both databases, and apart from a couple of outliers (Japan, Italy, and Germany
have higher wage inequality; France and the USA have lower wage inequality in
the PIAAC survey compared to the OECD database8), the micro data seems to
correspond well to the aggregate macro data. According to both data sources,
ranking of the countries in terms of inequality is almost unaffected. If D9/D5 and
D5/D1 are observed, deviations between the data sets are even smaller.
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3 Skills and wages across OECD countries
3.1 Skill dispersion
According to the OECD database, in the past 30 years, wage inequality has been
on the rise in almost all of the OECD countries (see OECD 2011; Jovicic and
Schettkat 2013). On the one hand, the increase in inequality has been criticized by
many economists; on the other hand, many others have justified this development
as a result of the rise in skill inequality (see Section 1). In order to get a better
insight on wage inequality and skill inequality, a deeper look into the data set and
some descriptive statistics is necessary. Table 1 presents the mean, median, stand-
ard deviation, and coefficient of variation of numeracy scores in core OECD coun-
tries. If all people are included, independent of their employment status, Anglo-Saxon
countries together with France and Spain have the highest dispersion of skills, whereas
Japan has the lowest inequality of numeracy skills. In terms of employed persons, the
countries with the highest skill inequality among employed workers are the USA, France,
and Italy (followed by Canada, the UK, and Ireland). Japan, Finland, and the Netherlands
(followed by Denmark and Belgium) have the lowest coefficient of variation of nu-
meracy test results. Coefficients of variation of numeracy scores are higher for all
persons than for employed persons in all countries, which implies that the un-
employed are likely to be lower skilled than the employed. Another very important
conclusion can be drawn from this table. Countries with higher skill inequality ex-
hibit lower average skill scores, whereas the countries with lower skill inequality
perform better in terms of average skill scores (mean). If the median is observed
instead of the mean, the conclusion is the same. In every country, the median is
only slightly higher than the mean; the difference between the two measures
ranges between a maximum five points and a minimum two points (the distribu-
tion of skills is just slightly skewed to the left). This leaves the ranking of the
countries according to their average results unaffected if the median is used
(instead of the mean).
Fig. 1 Wage inequality (D9/D1) for OECD countries, only employed persons. Source: OECD earnings
database and PIAAC
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In order to develop a better understanding of the cause of the difference in aver-
age numeracy score results, one must examine the share of people within different
skill levels. Skill levels are defined according to test scores and divided into six dif-
ferent groups. People with the highest scores are assigned to group levels 5 and 4,
whereas levels 0 and 1 are the groups with the lowest numeracy scores.9 Table 2
shows that the countries with the lowest numeracy test scores (and the highest
skill inequalities) have the highest proportion of workers in the lowest skill group
(below level 1 and at level 1)—Italy, the USA, France, and Spain. Japan, the
Netherlands, and Finland (followed by Denmark and Belgium) have the lowest per-
centage of least skilled workers. These countries, however, also have a slightly
higher percentage of people in the highest skill group.10 According to the PIAAC
survey evidence, countries with the highest numeracy test performance simply have
more high-skilled workers and fewer low-skilled workers.
Next, we examine differences in performance between different subgroups. Table 3
shows average numeracy test scores according to gender, immigration status, and age
groups. The difference between men and women is not large; it varies roughly between
8 points and 12 points. On average, men have slightly higher numeracy test scores than
women and this is true for every country. However, since women often demonstrate
poorer scores in the quantitative tests, comparing additionally the literacy test results
shows that there is almost no difference in the test performance (both men and women
have average literacy scores of around 277 points). On the other hand, immigrants11
have much lower results than non-immigrants—around 35 points less on average. The
biggest reason for this is the fact that the test was done in the countries’ national
languages; immigrants are disadvantaged comparatively to the non-immigrants and
often experience difficulty with the foreign language. This may suggest underestimation
Table 1 Mean, median, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation of numeracy scores for all
and employed persons
All persons Employed
Country Mean Median St dev. Var. coef. Mean Median St dev. Var. coef.
Canada 265.2 269.6 55.60 0.21 271.6 275.0 52.77 0.19
Denmark 278.2 282.0 51.23 0.18 285.7 288.9 47.63 0.17
Finland 282.2 285.8 52.21 0.18 291.3 293.2 47.63 0.16
France 254.1 259.1 56.17 0.22 260.9 265.1 54.42 0.21
Germany 271.7 275.9 53.07 0.20 277.5 280.4 49.71 0.18
Ireland 255.5 259.5 53.66 0.21 264.5 267.0 49.91 0.19
Italy 247.1 249.2 49.99 0.20 255.1 258.0 49.9 0.20
Japan 288.1 290.8 43.98 0.15 292.5 294.7 43.44 0.15
Austria 275.0 278.2 49.29 0.18 279.7 282.8 47.53 0.17
Netherlands 280.3 285.8 51.07 0.18 287.4 291.7 46.99 0.16
Flanders (Belgium) 280.3 284.4 50.59 0.18 286.6 290.2 48.42 0.17
Norway 278.3 283.5 54.21 0.19 285.8 289.9 50.55 0.18
Spain 245.8 250.3 51.32 0.21 257.5 261.3 47.58 0.18
Sweden 279.0 284.0 54.87 0.20 287.2 290.4 50.26 0.17
England/N. Ireland (UK) 261.7 264.9 54.88 0.21 270.9 273.3 51.6 0.19
USA 252.8 256.0 57.03 0.23 260.0 264.0 55.95 0.23
Source: calculations based on PIAAC
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of their proficiency skills. The only two countries where the difference is moderately
small are Ireland and to some extent Canada. Canada is a large immigration country
where immigration and integration policies probably play a big role and contribute to
higher language proficiency of immigrants. When age subgroups are compared, the dif-
ference is only marginal in almost all groups, aside from the oldest age group. People
Table 2 Share of population in 6 different skill levels, employed persons
Level 0 + 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 + 5
Country % % % %
Canada 18.76 32.00 34.84 14.39
Denmark 10.12 28.67 42.11 19.11
Finland 8.18 27.28 41.46 23.08
France 24.31 33.57 31.73 10.4
Germany 14.93 31.59 37.51 15.98
Ireland 20 37.63 32.66 9.71
Italy 26.55 37.59 29.61 6.24
Japan 6.84 26.03 45.35 21.78
Austria 12.11 32.20 40.11 15.57
Netherlands 9.63 27.26 43.34 19.77
Flanders (Belgium) 10.62 27.57 41.36 20.45
Norway 11.03 27.41 40.93 20.63
Spain 23.07 39.75 31.40 5.77
Sweden 10.84 26.97 40.34 21.86
England/N. Ireland (UK) 18.79 33.41 33.82 13.99
USA 25.41 33.43 30.47 10.69
Source: calculations based on PIAAC
Table 3 Mean of numeracy scores in different gender, immigrant and age groups, employed persons











Canada 277.32 265.33 275.95 262.5 271.71 281.94 277.63 266.11 258.61 271.6
Denmark 289.96 281.55 289.43 254.26 276.87 290.96 295.59 283.4 275.58 285.7
Finland 297.04 285.93 293.95 235.79 289.11 306.47 296.51 288.9 270.07 291.3
France 265 256.85 267.24 226.17 260.97 276.59 268.15 251.24 237.58 260.9
Germany 283.59 270.89 282.62 255.51 277.74 284.96 286.12 271.59 264.14 277.5
Ireland 270.05 259.66 265.4 261.01 262.43 271.13 270.8 257.91 243.34 264.5
Italy 255.82 254.19 258.65 222.72 232.03 265.66 257.54 252.8 240.83 255.1
Japan 298.07 285.35 292.56 266.98 282.61 301.13 299.47 295.66 275.15 292.5
Austria 285.77 273.26 285.14 254.9 274.1 285.03 285 277.38 269.32 279.7
Netherlands 294.13 280.31 291.8 255.46 287.44 298.73 292.58 282.48 268.82 287.4
Flanders 292.75 280.17 290.08 247.65 278.4 298.8 290.91 282.82 268.42 286.6
Norway 292.16 279.36 291.67 246.83 277.99 289.73 295.24 286.3 272.43 285.8
Spain 263.63 250.8 261.33 230.15 258.98 262.94 264.37 253.4 234.01 257.5
Sweden 292.2 281.69 294.12 255.36 286.57 297.08 293.2 282.35 276.34 287.2
UK 276.96 264.64 275.51 249.84 263.29 279.51 278.94 264.14 261.01 270.9
USA 265.71 253.79 265.64 235.46 249.81 260.34 257.48 250.39 247.07 260.0
Source: calculations based on PIAAC
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in the older age subgroups have lower results on average, probably due to the fact that
older people tend to forget and experience decline in skills after age 45, but especially
after the age of 50, according to Table 3. This is in line with various other studies that
dealt with literacy and numeracy skill surveys; however, this might not hold for other
skills. In general, wages increase with age, as well as the experience and some
experience-related skills. In most countries, the lowest age group also tends to have
slightly lower proficiency scores than the age groups from 25 to 45. What stands out is
that, in Denmark, Italy, and the USA, these age subgroups have similar results to the
oldest age subgroups, which is particularly alarming (especially in the USA and Italy,
since they also have very low scores). One reason for this (and comparatively lower
young age subgroup results in general) could be that the education systems alone do
not produce relevant work-related skills and that the quality of schooling and the
standard of education system are deteriorating.
Table 3 reveals some differences between various subgroups; thus, it is reasonable to
see whether compositional differences have an effect on average numeracy test scores
and dispersion of numeracy test scores. Population subgroups characterized by lower
average numeracy test scores were immigrants, followed by the oldest age group and
women. Whereas the share of women12 is comparable across countries, there is consid-
erable variation in the share of immigrants across countries, and this probably affects
the average numeracy score results and their dispersion.13 Some of the countries with a
high share of immigrants in the sample are found to have lower average numeracy test
scores. Lower average numeracy test scores in Canada, Ireland, the USA, and the UK
may be partly explained by higher shares of immigrants whose skills are underestimated
due to language difficulties. When immigrants are excluded from the sample, the aver-
age numeracy test scores increase in these countries and the coefficient of variation is
slightly reduced as well. This is true for every country, but the reduction is the highest
in the USA. The USA has the highest dispersion of skills, but this phenomenon can be
partly explained by the lower score of immigrants, and suggests that immigration status
should be controlled for in the regression analysis. There is also a moderate variation
in the share of the oldest age group in the employed population across countries, but
this does not appear to affect average scores nor the dispersion of scores
considerably.14
3.2 Wage dispersion and skill dispersion
In addition to the individual skill scores, the PIAAC data set provides information on
hourly wages15 of employed persons. Table 5 shows the dispersion of numeracy test
score results, wages, and years of schooling16 measured by the coefficient of variation.
This data already shows that there is no clear empirical relationship across countries
between wage dispersion and numeracy skill dispersion. Countries with the highest dis-
persions of numeracy test scores are the USA, France, Canada, and the UK, whereas
the countries with the lowest dispersions are Japan, the Netherlands, and Finland. In
terms of wage inequality, countries with the highest wage dispersion are Japan, the
USA, and the UK, and the countries with the lowest wage dispersions are Belgium,
Norway, Denmark, and Finland. If there was a strong link between skill dispersion and
wage dispersion, the data would be expected to show that the countries with the
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highest skill dispersions exhibit the highest wage dispersion and vice versa; this is not
always the case here. Additional analysis also shows that the same conclusions hold
when wage inequality between different population subgroups is observed. In all the
population subgroups examined (men, women, immigrants, non-immigrants, different
age subgroups), the countries with the highest wage dispersions are still Japan and
the USA, and the countries with the lowest wage dispersions are Belgium and the
Scandinavian countries (ranking of the countries remains intact).17
In order to develop a more comprehensive view of the relationship between skill dis-
persion and wage dispersion, in addition to measuring skills by proficiency score re-
sults, years of schooling are also included in the analysis. However, when years of
schooling is used in the analysis, this must be based on the assumption that 1 year of
schooling has the same effect on human capital formation in every country, which is
difficult to confirm. International skill proficiency surveys are thus becoming more and
more popular, since their comparability is likely to be more reliable. According to
the estimates, there is a positive but weak correlation between numeracy test
scores and years of schooling—correlation coefficient for the entire PIAAC sample
is 0.44 (correlation coefficient varies between 0.36 and 0.60 for individual coun-
tries). The fact that years of schooling and numeracy skills are positively correlated
is expected, since longer schooling produces higher levels of skills and, at the same
time, higher skilled individuals acquire more schooling. However, the rather small
size of the correlation is somewhat surprising.18 One potential explanation is that
schooling is related to unmeasured competencies and unobserved non-cognitive
skill (or some dimension of cognitive skills other than numeracy skills). Table 5
shows that dispersion of years of schooling is slightly higher or the same as the
dispersion of test scores in most countries. The only three countries that have rela-
tively high dispersion in years of schooling are Italy, France, and Spain;19 countries
with the lowest skill dispersion measured by schooling are the UK, Norway, and
Germany.
In addition to the distribution of numeracy test scores, years of schooling, and wages,
Table 4 reports correlation coefficients between these variables. The correlation coeffi-
cient between wages and numeracy scores is positive but ranges between 0.14 and 0.37
only. This could be additional proof that cross-country variation in numeracy scores is
not strongly associated with cross-country variation in wages. Although the variable of
years of schooling performs a bit better (its correlation to wages is higher and ranges
between 0.24 and 0.51), it can hardly confirm the skill compression hypothesis. Possible
explanations for why there is a stronger link between years of schooling and wages
(than between numeracy test scores and wages) could be that either unmeasured com-
petencies are related to years of schooling or years of schooling is positively associated
with wages through the signaling effect—the employer assumes that more schooling is
positively correlated with having advanced abilities. It could be that years of schooling
has a large effect on wages, without having a large effect on skills measured by numer-
acy test scores.
In order to conclude the discussion on skill and wage dispersion and get a more com-
prehensive description of their relationship, in addition to the coefficient of variation,
other measures of inequality are examined. Table 6 shows decile ratios (D9/D1, D9/D5,
D5/D120) of skill and wage dispersion. Decile ratios reveal additional evidence against
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the skill compression hypothesis. Since wage inequality in the top half of the distribu-
tion is higher and varies most across countries (D9/D5 is higher than D5/D1), it was
expected that the same would be true for skill inequality. However, Table 5 shows that
the opposite is the case. The highest skill inequality and the highest variability in skill
inequality are observed for measures of skill inequality in the bottom half of the skill
Table 4 Coefficient of variation of average numeracy scores, hourly wages, and years of schooling
and their correlation coefficient, employed persons
Coefficient of variation Correlation coefficient
Country Scores Wages Schooling Scores–wages Scores–schooling Wages–schooling
Canada 0.19 0.21 0.42
Denmark 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.31 0.39 0.46
Finland 0.16 0.38 0.22 0.31 0.43 0.46
France 0.21 0.43 0.29 0.33 0.60 0.37
Germany 0.18 0.52 0.18 0.33 0.46 0.51
Ireland 0.19 0.55 0.19 0.33 0.47 0.36
Italy 0.20 0.53 0.33 0.23 0.41 0.34
Japan 0.15 0.69 0.18 0.26 0.46 0.29
Austria 0.17 0.58 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.38
Netherlands 0.16 0.46 0.19 0.27 0.40 0.45
Belgium 0.17 0.37 0.20 0.32 0.49 0.39
Norway 0.18 0.37 0.17 0.31 0.37 0.42
Spain 0.18 0.53 0.28 0.34 0.51 0.46
Sweden 0.17 0.21 0.39
UK 0.19 0.61 0.17 0.36 0.36 0.36
USA 0.23 0.67 0.23 0.37 0.55 0.47
Source: calculations based on PIAAC
Table 5 Distribution of individual average numeracy test scores and wages, by country
Decile ratios Literacy scores Hourly earnings
Country D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 D8/D5
Canada 1.71 1.23 1.39
Denmark 1.59 1.20 1.32 2.65 1.56 1.70 1.30
Finland 1.59 1.21 1.31 2.65 1.75 1.51 1.44
France 1.79 1.24 1.44 2.52 1.77 1.43 1.43
Germany 1.66 1.21 1.37 4.16 1.91 2.18 1.52
Ireland 1.68 1.23 1.37 3.65 2.11 1.73 1.65
Italy 1.69 1.24 1.36 3.20 1.88 1.70 1.47
Japan 1.48 1.17 1.26 4.01 2.34 1.71 1.74
Austria 1.57 1.20 1.31 3.05 1.81 1.69 1.43
Netherlands 1.58 1.19 1.33 3.29 1.79 1.84 1.47
Belgium 1.60 1.20 1.33 2.58 1.67 1.54 1.38
Norway 1.63 1.20 1.35 2.47 1.60 1.54 1.30
Spain 1.73 1.23 1.41 3.56 2.08 1.71 1.61
Sweden 1.63 1.21 1.35
UK 1.72 1.24 1.38 3.47 2.08 1.67 1.59
USA 1.81 1.26 1.44 4.5 2.2 2.00 1.78
Source: calculations based on PIAAC
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distribution. In every country, skill inequality at the bottom of the distribution is higher
than at the top, whereas the opposite holds for wage inequality (the only exceptions are
Denmark, Germany, and to some extent the Netherlands where wage inequality in
the bottom half of the skill distribution is higher than that in the top half of the
distribution). These patterns contradict the skill compression hypothesis, and this
conclusion is further confirmed by looking at the last column of Table 5. If the
top wage decile is excluded (instead of D9/D5, we look at D8/D5), wage inequality
drops significantly in every country. It leads to the conclusion that the primary
contributors of high wage inequalities are excessively high wages at the top. These
high wages are most likely a consequence of “celebrity” and “managerial” wages,
usually caused by peer behavior and rent seeking. This observation contradicts the
view that higher wage inequality will do much to improve the outcomes of the
people at the bottom, as is promoted by the economists who support the wage
compression hypothesis. On other hand, this exercise shows that wages are indeed
more compressed in the bottom half of the distribution than in the top half of the
wage distribution in all countries (despite more dispersed skills at the bottom).
This is a starting point that could offer support for a wage compression hypothesis.
In order to investigate if the wage compression hypothesis is correct, and whether
compressed wages are related to unemployment, an examination of employment
differences between countries is necessary (see Section 6).
Regardless of whether the relationship between skill inequality and wage inequality is
measured by decile ratios or coefficient of variation, the relationship is not statistically
significant (see Fig. 2). The correlation coefficients21 are 0.11, 0.24, and 0.19, res-
pectively. Inequality in numeracy test scores is not correlated with wage inequality,
and this is why the variation in numeracy skill inequality cannot explain the vari-
ation in wage inequality across core OECD countries. The same is true if years of
schooling are used as a measure of skill. The relationship between the coefficient
A
B
Fig. 2 Relationship between skill inequality and wage inequality, employed persons. a D5/D1 and D9/D5
ratios of wages and numeracy test scores, employed persons. b Coefficient of variation of wages, skills, and
schooling, employed persons. Source: calculations based on PIAAC
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of variation of wages and years of schooling is flat—there is no significant relation-
ship between the two; the correlation coefficient is low: −0.06. It does not hold
that countries with higher skill dispersion (either measured by numeracy test
scores or years of schooling) have higher wage dispersion and vice versa, as the
lower panel of Fig. 2 suggests. Countries with similar skill inequality differ signifi-
cantly in terms of wage inequality. The skill compression hypothesis cannot be
confirmed based on the cross-country analysis presented here.
Although there is some criticism (see Broecke et al. 2016), these rather descriptive re-
sults are in line with other wage and skill distribution analysis conducted previously
with the PIAAC data set (and this is why deeper analysis is not necessary). Paccagnella
(2015) investigated the relationship between skill inequality and wage inequality based
on PIAAC data and 22 OECD countries. He finds no strong relationship between the
two. Based on his decomposition exercise, he concludes that the wage structure effect
(differences in the rates of returns to observable characteristics) seems to be more
important in explaining cross-country differences in wage dispersion than the com-
position effect (differences in observable characteristics). Pena (2016) also uses the
decomposition method similar to Juhn et al. (1993) and finds that unobservable
factors (such as labor and product market institutions) play a major role in
explaining cross-country differences in wage dispersion; the effect of skills is rather
small. Thus, both papers suggest that institutions are potentially likely to explain a
larger share of cross-country differences in wage dispersion.
4 Wage dispersion and return to skills
The wage compression hypothesis is based on the perfect market theory, according
to which, wages correspond to marginal productivity. Empirically, wage regression
analysis should be able to explain the variation in wages. In this body of literature,
Mincer (1958, 1974) was the pioneer in defining earnings as a function of school-
ing and experience in the log-linear form. The Mincer earnings equation proved to
be a big empirical success in labor market economics, and the model is still a good
specification for estimating the relationships between schooling, experience, and
earnings relatively accurately (see Lemieux 2006). The empirical model that is to
be estimated in this paper is based on the Mincer earnings equation and has the
following principal form:
ln wð Þ ¼ a þ bS þ cX þ dG þ eI þ u ð1Þ
where ln(w) is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage, S corresponds to the
qualification level (numeracy test scores or years of schooling, or both), X is ex-
perience (defined as years of labor market experience), G is a gender indicator, I
denotes immigration status, u is a residual, and a, b, c, d, e are parameters to be
estimated.
Table 6 reports the results from OLS regressions of log wage on numeracy test
scores and years of schooling in models which include controls for gender, ex-
perience, experience squared, and immigrant status (see Eq. 1). Model 1 results
show considerable variation across countries. In some countries, an increase in
numeracy test scores is associated with higher wages than in other countries. An
increase of 100 numeracy score points is associated with a 30% increase in the
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average wage in the pooled sample across countries. The highest coefficients are
in the USA, the UK, Germany, and Spain, and the lowest are in Norway, Italy,
and Denmark. If one interpreted these results by saying that skills affect wages
significantly in the USA (coefficient = 0.48), one needs to be able to explain why
the coefficient is only 0.21 in the case of Norway. Differences in dispersion of
numeracy skills explain the differences in dispersion of earnings only partly.
Model 2 shows that the coefficient of years of schooling on wages is the highest
in the USA (11%), Germany (10%) and the UK, and the Netherlands (9%),
whereas the lowest is in Italy, France, and Scandinavia (6%). On average, one
extra year of schooling is associated with 7% higher earnings. Once we add both
numeracy scores and years of schooling to the model, both coefficients are sig-
nificant, although the size of the score coefficient drops significantly (from 0.30
to 0.15 in the pooled regression). This is due to the fact that numeracy skills and
schooling are correlated (0.45 on average). However, big variation across coun-
tries is evident here as well; whereas in most of the countries the skill coefficient
drops by around half, in the UK, Ireland, and Norway, it drops less. In this
model, the coefficient of years of schooling remains stable at 7% on average. The
1% fall is observed in all countries, except for the UK and the USA, where the
drop is equal to 2%. These findings are similar to those of Hanushek et al.
(2014)22.
Once controlled for all factors, why does return to skills vary so much across coun-
tries? Although the fact that the coefficients are highest in the first model could lead to
the conclusion that the skill compression hypothesis holds, this notion is rejected.
Especially in the model where both skills and years of schooling are included, the coef-
ficient for skills drops by half. It might be that schooling affects wages independ-
ently from numeracy skills (possibly through the signaling effect). However, it all
Table 6 Regression of log wages on numeracy test scores and years of schooling, employed persons
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Country Scores R2 Schooling R2 Scores Schooling R2
Denmark 0.22 (0.01) 0.34 0.06 (0.00) 0.44 0.09 (0.01) 0.06 (0.00) 0.45
Finland 0.24 (0.01) 0.25 0.06 (0.00) 0.38 0.11 (0.01) 0.06 (0.00) 0.40
France 0.30 (0.01) 0.23 0.06 (0.00) 0.32 0.14 (0.01) 0.05 (0.00) 0.34
Germany 0.39 (0.02) 0.28 0.10 (0.00) 0.37 0.18 (0.02) 0.09 (0.00) 0.39
Ireland 0.34 (0.02) 0.23 0.08 (0.00) 0.29 0.20 (0.02) 0.07 (0.00) 0.32
Italy 0.22 (0.02) 0.14 0.06 (0.00) 0.26 0.08 (0.02) 0.05 (0.00) 0.27
Japan 0.34 (0.02) 0.29 0.07 (0.01) 0.31 0.22 (0.02) 0.06 (0.01) 0.33
Netherlands 0.30 (0.02) 0.34 0.09 (0.00) 0.47 0.13 (0.02) 0.08 (0.00) 0.48
Flanders (Belgium) 0.28 (0.01) 0.25 0.07 (0.00) 0.34 0.14 (0.01) 0.06 (0.00) 0.36
Norway 0.21 (0.01) 0.31 0.06 (0.00) 0.39 0.11 (0.01) 0.05 (0.00) 0.41
Spain 0.35 (0.03) 0.18 0.08 (0.00) 0.33 0.15 (0.03) 0.07 (0.00) 0.34
England/N. Ireland 0.40 (0.02) 0.29 0.09 (0.00) 0.29 0.30 (0.02) 0.07 (0.00) 0.36
USA 0.48 (0.02) 0.28 0.11 (0.00) 0.39 0.22 (0.02) 0.09 (0.00) 0.42
Pooled 0.30 (0.01) 0.25 0.07 (0.00) 0.34 0.15 (0.01) 0.07 (0.00) 0.36
Source: calculations based on PIAAC
Note: Controls: experience, experience2, gender, and immigration status. Tables are available upon request. For the
purpose of easier interpretation, numeracy test scores are divided by 100
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leads to the conclusion that there must be something else (in addition to numeracy
scores and years of schooling) that affects wage structure significantly and affects
wage inequality as well.23 As mentioned above, if the perfect market theory was
correct, wages should be explained by the wage regression and residual should be
equal to one. However, Mincer equations explain only 30% of the variation of
wages; this either disproves the perfect market hypothesis or increases the rele-
vance of immeasurable skills Schettkat (2008).
5 Dispersion within skill level
While it is often argued that high wage inequality fosters investment in human capital,
Agell (1999) claimed that that could be true but only if the wage dispersion is between
education levels. However, if there is high wage dispersion within the same education
level, wage dispersion serves as a discouragement for educational attainment. Based on
similar logic, as among the most convincing evidence that the skill hypothesis does not
hold, Devroye and Freeman (2001) used the tables that show that dispersion of wages
is much higher within skill levels than between skill levels. If skill determines wages,
people at the same skill level should earn similar wages—the highest dispersion should
be between different skill levels; within skill levels, there should barely be any signifi-
cant dispersion. In their analysis based on the IALS data set and four OECD countries,
Freeman and Devroye find that this was not the case. We perform the same calcula-
tions based on the PIAAC data set. Table 7 records the coefficient of the variation of
log wages by six defined numeracy test score levels. The conclusion is the same—wage
dispersion within skill levels differs significantly across countries. The highest
Table 7 Coefficient of variation of log wages by score and schooling level, employed persons
Skill levels Schooling levels
Country L0 + 1 L2 L3 L4 + 5 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
Canada
Denmark 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06
Finland 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10
France 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.13
Germany 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.28 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.15
Ireland 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.15
Italy 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.16
Japan 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
Austria 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.14
Netherlands 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.13
Belgium 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.12
Norway 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Spain 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.17
Sweden
UK 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.19
US 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16
Source: calculations based on PIAAC
Notes: Schooling levels: 1—lower secondary or less (ISCED 1, 2, 3C short or less); 2—upper secondary (ISCED 3A-B, C
long); 3—post-secondary, non-tertiary (ISCED 4A-B-C); 4—tertiary—professional degree (ISCED 5B); 5—tertiary—bachelor
degree (ISCED 5A); 6—tertiary—master/research degree (ISCED 5A/6)
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dispersions of earnings are in Germany, Ireland, Spain, and the USA for every score
level. The smallest dispersions are in Japan, Denmark, and Norway. Countries that have
the highest wage dispersion in the lowest skill levels have on average comparatively
higher wage dispersions for all skill levels and vice versa. In the second part of Table 7,
the same exercise is performed for six different schooling levels.24 Schooling levels tell
the same story. It is interesting to see how countries do not deviate at all in the coeffi-
cient of variation of wages. Countries that have among the highest within-skill-level
wage dispersion also have the highest within-schooling-level dispersion of wages. The
biggest variation is within different schooling levels and not between them, and it is as-
tonishing how this pattern is repeated in every country and on every schooling level.
Thus, variation in numeracy skills cannot fully explain the variation in wages. Some
other factor (other than numeracy skills and schooling) in these countries and their in-
stitutional settings must create these differences.
High wage dispersion within skill and schooling levels is in stark contrast with the
marginal productivity theory. Based on the theoretical perfect market model, the mar-
ginal productivity theory claims that everybody is paid according to their contribu-
tion—to their marginal productivity. The empirical implication of this theory shows
that there is the same wage for the same work. Since productivity is difficult to meas-
ure, it is necessary to find different proxies that could account for it. The most obvious
ones are skills. Stiglitz (2013) commented that he wishes bankers were paid according
to their marginal productivity during crisis. Proponents of marginal productivity theory
and perfect markets try to defend their theory by claiming that people with the same
measurable skills might differ in their immeasurable skills and this is why their
wages are different; yet explanations based on monopsonistic labor market seem
more plausible (see Manning 2003).
6 Wage compression and unemployment
Since the variation in wage dispersion across countries cannot be fully explained by
variation in skill dispersion and its theoretical foundations seem to be flawed, another
set of explanations needs to be considered. Some economists stress the importance of
variation in wage-setting institutions across countries, for example, minimum wages
and unions (Freeman 1991; Freeman and Katz 1994; Blau and Kahn 1996) as the most
plausible explanation for cross-country variation in wage dispersion. Before the link
between wage dispersion and unemployment is explored, the relationship between
wage-setting institutions and wage dispersion is examined. Table 8 shows a clear
pattern—there is a significant negative correlation between various wage bargaining in-
stitutions and wage inequality. Countries with higher union density and union member-
ship, stronger and more coordinated wage bargaining institutions, and higher
minimum wages have lower wage inequality and vice versa. This is in line with other
studies based on panel data analysis (Schettkat 2003; Freeman 2007; Salverda and
Checchi 2014). It is interesting to observe that the correlation coefficient between wage
dispersion and various institutions is much higher than the correlation coefficient
between wages and skills (see Section 3). Regrettably, the PIAAC data set does not pro-
vide information on union membership of the employees, so more thorough analysis is
not possible. However, this data set offers information on employment status which
allows us to examine the wage compression hypothesis.
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As seen in the previous table, minimum wages and wage-setting institutions are
negatively correlated with wage inequality. This is exactly why some economists
(neoclassical school of thought) claim that strong institutions cause wage compres-
sion, which in turn causes high unemployment among the low skilled (Siebert
1997; Heckman and Jacobs 2010). Due to skill-biased technical change, the relative
demand for low-skilled workers declined in the past three decades. In countries
with flexible labor markets (and weaker institutions), workers’ wages dropped but
they remained employed. In countries with rigid markets, institutions prevented
the wages of low-skilled workers from falling and therefore these workers lost their
jobs. In the first group of countries, an increase in wage inequality contributed to
comparatively higher employment. If the wage compression hypothesis was true
and differences in wage inequalities across countries can explain differences in em-
ployment, we expect to find a positive relationship between wage inequality in the
bottom half of the wage distribution and employment among low-skilled workers.
This explanation is based on the marginal productivity hypothesis, according to
which, wages always correspond to the marginal product of labor. If there is no in-
stitutional intervention, the free market leads to solutions in which people earn
what they contribute. Setting a wage through various forms of labor market institu-
tions will lead to a higher wage than marginal productivity and higher unemploy-
ment subsequently.
In order to get a complete measure of labor market performance, employment to
population rates (e-pops), the unemployment rate, and average weekly hours worked
per head were calculated from the PIAAC survey or were already available (weekly
hours worked). Table 9 shows the correlation matrix for various measures of labor mar-
ket performance and wage inequality (for all employed persons and all skill levels). The
majority of correlation signs are statistically insignificant. No matter which measure of
labor market performance is being used, the relationship between labor market per-
formance and wage inequality is insignificant and flat. If we look at the whole sample
(regardless of skill level), there seems to be no significant relationship between these
measures. In the case of e-pops25 and unemployment rates, the correlation sign actually
contradicts the wage compression hypothesis, although it is insignificant. If skill levels
are accounted for, most of the correlations still remain insignificant at a 10% signifi-
cance level.26 E-pops, average hours worked, and unemployment rates are not related
to wage inequality, either at the top or at the bottom. According to Table 9, and











COV −0.65a −0.78a −0.63a −0.84a −0.78a
D9/D1 −0.70a −0.85a −0.61a −0.71a −0.62a
D9/D5 −0.72a −0.71a −0.61a −0.86a −0.76a
D5/D1 −0.43a −0.67a −0.38a −0.37a −0.32a
Gini −0.66a −0.87a −0.69a −0.78a −0.72a
Source: institutions from Schumpeter School International Comparative Institutions Database, for details, see (Jovicic 2015).
Wage Inequality from PIAAC
aRepresents 1% significance level
bComprehensiveness index corresponds to product of bargaining level and bargaining coverage (see Schettkat 2003)
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analysis based on the core OECD countries, there is no evidence for wage compression
hypothesis.
Furthermore, Fig. 3 focuses only on the relationships between wage inequality
(D5/D1) and employment for the low-skilled workers and allows additionally ob-
serving individual countries. The first diagram in the upper left corner shows a
slightly positive (although insignificant) relationship between the D5/D1 wage ratio
and e-pops in the lowest skill level. The USA is the country with high wage inequality
(D5/D1) that simultaneously has a good performance in terms of employment. However,
all three diagrams find no support for the wage compression hypothesis—countries’ labor
Table 9 Relationship between wage inequality and labor market performance, employed persons
Employment/wage inequality D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1
E-pop −0.0049 −0.2587 0.2418
Hours worked 0.3083 0.5045a −0.0382
Unemployment rate 0.2307 0.3357 0.0454
E-pop, skill level 0 + 1 0.2674 0.1685 0.2407
E-pop, skill level 2 0.1263 −0.1451 0.3423
E-pop, skill level 3 0.1304 −0.2086 0.4092
E-pop, skill level 4 + 5 0.0877 −0.2269 0.3358
Hours worked, skill level 0 + 1 0.0772 0.3087 −0.2154
Hours worked, skill level 2 0.2545 0.4557 −0.0646
Hours worked, skill level 3 0.2903 0.5052a −0.0700
Hours worked, skill level 4 + 5 0.4029 0.5713a 0.0411
Unemployment rate, skill level 0 + 1 0.2302 0.2940 0.1030
Unemployment rate, skill level 2 0.2364 0.3165 0.0699
Unemployment rate, skill level 3 0.1473 0.2802 −0.0268
Unemployment rate, skill level 4 + 5 −0.3019 −0.0389 −0.4536
Source: calculations based on PIAAC
aRepresents 10% significance level
Fig. 3 Wage inequality (D5/D1) and employment for the low-skilled workers. Source: calculations based
on PIAAC
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market performance in the low-skill sector does not show a relation to wage inequality at
the bottom half of the wage distribution; the pattern is rather mixed.
Why do some countries do so well in terms of low-skill employment, whereas others
are much less successful in job creation? Can this cross-country variation in em-
ployment be explained by cross-country variation in wage inequality? Figure 4 pre-
sents e-pops/hours worked per head/unemployment rate for four different skill
levels for eight selected countries. Countries are selected according to the lowest
(highest) proportion of employed persons in the low-skill group. The diagram dis-
plays a very clear pattern. Employment to population rates are highest in high skill
level groups, as expected. Countries that have comparatively higher employment
Fig. 4 Employment to population rate for four different skill levels, by country. Source: calculations based
on PIAAC
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among low-skilled workers (the USA, Norway, and Canada) also demonstrate
higher employment in the other skill groups. Countries with the lowest employ-
ment among low-skilled workers (Spain, Ireland, and Italy) also have the lowest
employment in other skill groups. When wage inequality among these countries is
observed, the picture becomes mixed and there is no clear pattern. It rather seems
more plausible that some countries are in general more successful in employment
creation than others. It is not the low-skill sector and excessively high wages at
the bottom of the wage distribution that make the whole difference in the employ-
ment performance of the countries but rather something else, e.g., economic
policy-making. The only country that does not follow this general pattern is Japan.
It has one of the highest e-pops in the lowest skill groups L0 and L1, whereas e-
pops in other skill groups are significantly lower. The same story is true for un-
employment rates. Only at the highest skill levels is unemployment low everywhere
with no pattern across countries—high-skilled workers have low unemployment
rates in all countries (under 6%). However, all other countries exhibit either high
or low unemployment, regardless of the skill level. Average hours worked per head
do not seem to vary much at different skill levels in Spain, Italy, Finland, and
Sweden. In other countries, higher skills are related to higher number of hours
worked and they are especially high for the highest skill workers. Even in countries
with flexible wages in the bottom half of the wage distribution, average hours
worked for low-skilled workers are lower than hours worked for high-skilled
workers and well paid. Germany, the Netherlands, and Ireland have at the same
time the highest wage dispersion in the bottom half of the wage distribution and
the lowest average hours worked in the low-skill sector, which is not in line with
theory. It is actually in Finland (low inequality country) in which there is no difference in
the average weekly hours worked across skill groups.
Finally, in order to perform an additional check, the mean and median score results
between the employed and unemployed across countries are compared. If the wage
compression hypothesis was true, it would be expected that, in the countries with rigid
labor markets and low inequality, the pool of unemployed consists mainly of low-
skilled workers. At the same time, countries with flexible labor markets are expected to
have much higher employment in the low-skilled sector27 (and low skilled should not
be unemployed).28 Table 10 shows the mean, median, and standard deviation of numer-
acy skill scores by labor force status. Employed persons in the USA, the UK, Spain, and
Italy have lower average scores than the unemployed in Japan, Belgium, Finland,
Denmark, and the Netherlands. Since the latter countries (apart from Japan) have at
the same time a more compressed wage structure, low-skilled people in these countries
should be unemployed (on the basis that their wage is too high). Indeed, some of these
less unequal countries do demonstrate low employment at the bottom. But these
workers are not unskilled; their average score results are too high, as the data suggests.
The data actually shows that the unemployed in these countries have higher average
scores than the employed in some other countries. On the other hand, in the first
group of countries, where wage flexibility is higher, the employment of low-skilled
workers should be higher. However, the unemployed do have very low average skill
scores, which is contradictory to the wage compression hypothesis. Furthermore, in
Japan, there is almost no difference in the average score results between the employed
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and unemployed, which is again evidence against the wage compression hypothesis.
The average score results of people out of the labor force are comparable to those of
the unemployed people with a minor variation in the number of score points in both
directions.
But then again, who are the employed, unemployed, and out-of-labor force? Are the
subgroups of these three pools of people somehow different and can they reveal im-
portant insights? Data shows29 that on average (in the pooled sample) there is no large
difference between men and women—they are almost equally represented in both pools
of the employed and unemployed. The share of men in the employed population is
slightly higher than the share of women—their share varies between 52 and 54% in
almost every country, with the notable exceptions of Italy and Japan where the share of
men in the employed population is 60 and 58%, respectively. However, on average, the
people who make up the out-of-labor force are more likely to be women (60%), com-
pared to only 40% men in this group. This share is even higher in Japan, Italy, the
Netherlands, the USA, and the UK, where women’s participation in the labor market is
lower than men’s, possibly while they engage more in the household activities and par-
enthood and due to social norms. Only in the Scandinavian countries does there seem
to be almost no gender difference in this regard. When it comes to immigration status,
immigrants are only slightly more present in the pool of the unemployed compared to
the pool of the employed and the out-of-labor force, relative to the non-immigrants.
The main conclusion about the age subgroups is that unemployment is gradually de-
creasing with age across all countries. The pool of people out of the labor force is
mainly represented by the lowest and highest age subgroups (age groups 1 and 5), and
these two groups together account for around 60% of those out-of-labor forces
on average.
Table 10 Mean and standard deviation of numeracy skill scores by labor force status
Employed Unemployed Out-of-labor force
Country Mean Median sd Mean Median sd Mean Median sd
Canada 271.66 275.03 52.77 249.22 253.41 54.96 244.41 249.26 60.18
Denmark 285.54 288.93 48.64 265.43 268.74 50.13 256.54 258.59 53.32
Finland 289.70 291.94 48.45 271.21 275.33 56.99 263.58 268.26 56.19
France 261.14 265.48 54.22 244.86 248.02 53.51 241.27 247.33 58.27
Germany 278.43 282.07 49.97 248.43 248.90 49.07 251.74 255.49 58.35
Ireland 264.35 266.99 50.17 246.98 250.29 50.12 240.18 246.60 57.65
Italy 255.00 257.20 49.31 236.38 241.41 50.62 237.33 239.22 48.62
Japan 291.03 293.52 43.99 285.69 285.76 43.80 280.17 283.01 43.01
Austria 279.78 282.81 47.53 265.33 269.37 51.86 261.41 264.63 51.58
Netherlands 286.86 291.30 47.38 264.84 270.00 56.89 258.45 264.04 56.41
Belgium (Flanders) 287.18 290.62 48.64 278.17 277.92 49.09 263.51 268.61 51.53
Norway 285.05 289.47 51.31 256.80 262.47 55.71 252.44 258.59 57.47
Spain 256.24 259.84 47.77 234.72 238.83 50.43 229.33 236.39 53.53
Sweden 287.22 290.41 50.26 255.12 263.08 59.44 256.62 264.86 60.57
England/N. Ireland (UK) 269.80 272.30 51.69 236.61 238.70 55.69 244.25 246.64 57.51
USA 260.04 264.03 55.95 235.63 236.30 46.89 232.21 235.90 58.14
Source: calculations based on PIAAC
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Challenges to the validity of the wage compression hypothesis have been made in
earlier cross-country empirical work (Glyn et al. 2006; Howell et al. 2007; Jovicic and
Schettkat 2013), which found no evidence of a relation between wage compression
(strong institutions) and unemployment. There are also a number of studies based on
micro data that could not explain the high European unemployment rates with institu-
tional rigidity (Card et al. 1996; Krueger and Pischke 1997). At the same time, some
other economists were insisting on exploring the aggregate demand deficiency and
macroeconomic policies as a potential explanation for employment differences across
countries (see Solow 2008; Krugman 2009; Schettkat and Sun 2009; Wolf 2014).
However, this evidence appears to have been ignored, and the deregulation of welfare-
state institutions remained the main policy recommendations even today in Europe.
6.1 Share of low-paid jobs
It is doubtful that countries with rigid labor market institutions and rigid wages at the
bottom of the distribution have low employment among the low-skilled workforce, as
the previous analysis showed. What are the consequences of compressed wage struc-
tures? Figure 5 shows the share of low-paid jobs, where low pay is defined as 2/3 of the
median wage in OECD countries. The countries with the highest share of low-paid jobs
are Germany, the USA, Japan, and the UK. Not surprisingly, these are the countries
where the dispersion of the wages in the bottom half of the wage distribution is rela-
tively high. (Alternatively, the USA has a relatively high employment among low-skilled
workers, but this is certainly not the case for the rest of the countries.) The high share
of low-payed jobs was not enough to produce high employment in the low-skill sector
in Japan, the UK, and Ireland. On the other hand, Norway managed to maintain well-
paid jobs and high employment at the same time. The only certain result of the wage
flexibility hypothesis is that there is a higher share of low-paid jobs. Proponents of the
low-pay policy claim that this is still better than unemployment. This paper, however,
finds no evidence for the wage compression hypothesis.
Fig. 5 Share of low-paid jobs measured as two thirds of median wage, employed persons. Source: calculations
based on PIAAC
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7 Conclusions
Based on the PIAAC adult skill survey, this paper examined international differences
in wage inequality and skills and whether a compressed wage distribution is associ-
ated with high unemployment across core OECD countries. Although both the skill
compression and wage compression hypotheses have strong theoretical backgrounds,
none of them could be empirically verified based on this cross-country study. Firstly,
there is a large variation in wage dispersion across countries, but its correlation to
variation in skill dispersion is rather weak. Even when accounted for skills, some
countries have a more compressed wage structure. Instead, it seems plausible that the
other set of explanations in terms of institutions have more power in explaining these
differences. According to this analysis, the correlation between various measures of
institutions and wage inequality is significantly higher than the correlation between
skill inequality and wage inequality. However, in order to confirm this finding, a more
detailed analysis is required. Secondly, relative employment performance of low-
skilled workers is not worse in countries where the wage premium for skill is more rigid
(lower wage inequality). Countries that do well in this sector in terms of employ-
ment perform well in general (in all the other groups as well), which is independent from
the level of wage inequality. On average, countries that have higher e-pops, higher hours
worked, and a lower unemployment rate do not have high wage inequality, either at the
top or at the bottom of the wage distribution. The only certain result of wage flexibility is
that there is a higher share of low-paid jobs (but this high share of low-paid jobs does not
appear to be related to high employment).
These results (although descriptive) have some important implications for policy-
making. Based on the perfect market model, marginal productivity theory, skill
compression and wage compression hypotheses, etc., institutional reform (which
should lead to higher wage dispersion) was considered as the appropriate policy
response to increase competitiveness, output, and employment (see OECD 1994;
IMF 2003). When not distressed by regulation and public policy, markets should
lead to wages that correspond to marginal productivity and full employment should
follow. Compressed wages are seen as a likely cause of high unemployment, espe-
cially in the low-skill sector; consequently, permitting higher wage dispersion
should stimulate employment. The same thinking, grounded on the equity-
efficiency trade-off, is guiding austerity measures and reductions in public services
in the EU today. This study challenges both hypotheses and the theoretical as-
sumptions they are derived from; it calls for a revision of current policies. Rather
than insisting on a deregulation of labor market institutions as the main policy
recommendation to achieve higher employment (and higher wage inequality),
policymakers should reconsider demand deficiency and macroeconomic policies as
potential explanations for the employment differences across countries (see Solow
2008; Krugman 2009; Schettkat and Sun 2009; Wolf 2014). Consistent with this
view, expansionary macroeconomic policies—stimulative demand policies—might be
necessary in order to achieve high employment and low unemployment. Moreover,
high inequality is correlated to major health and social problems, e.g., crime,
violence, anxiety, mental illness, obesity, infant mortality, and imprisonment rates
(see Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). The causation behind these correlations is sub-
ject to further scrutiny however (see Salverda et al. 2014). Not only do high wage
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dispersions have negative consequences on societies, but this study also shows that
wage dispersion is not vital for better labor market performance.
This study builds on the previous work of Devroye and Freeman (2001) and Freeman
and Schettkat (2001), who performed similar analysis based on the IALS literacy survey
from 1998 and two (four) countries. These findings, based on the more recent literacy
survey (PIAAC) and core OECD countries, are in line with their findings and confirm
their results. However, one must acknowledge that literacy surveys have their limita-
tions; they capture a narrow measure of skills. Furthermore, the evidence presented
here is rather descriptive. Yet, if the skill compression and wage compression hypotheses
were true, even descriptive cross-country analysis would be expected to show that there
are correlations and patterns between the variables of interest. The evidence presented
herein illustrates that this is certainly not the case.
Endnotes
1In their paper, however, skills are measured by years of schooling and not by
competency test scores.
2Problem solving is not measured in France, Italy, and Spain.
3Belgium is represented by its subunit Flanders. It is the most developed part of the
country, with the lowest unemployment rate, and it cannot be considered as a repre-
sentative for the whole country. It is important to keep this in mind when interpreting
the study results.
4For Germany, the USA, and Austria, we obtained a Scientific-Use-File from their
national centers (GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, American Institutes
for Research, and Statistics Austria, respectively). For Canada and Sweden, information
about continuous earnings is not available.
5National samples are weighted to population in the relevant time period.
6The PIAAC sample design requires using plausible values of score technique which
is used through the whole analysis.
7These are available on request.
8The OECD earnings database collects data on gross earnings of full-time dependent
employees which are usually taken from household surveys.
9Skill levels are defined according to numeracy score results in the following way:
L0 < 176; L1 = 176–226; L2 = 226–276; L3 = 276–326; L4 = 326–376; L5 > 376 points.
10The share of population in skill groups L0 and L5 is very low and not representative;
that is why they are observed together with groups L1 and L4.
11Immigrants include first-generation immigrants. Quick tabulation shows that
around 76% of the immigrants are not native speakers. Being a native speaker is highly
correlated with higher scores in every country. On average, native speakers have 40
points higher scores than non-native speakers.
12The share of women in the employed population varies between 46 and 49% in
almost all countries, with the notable exceptions of Italy and Japan where the share of
women in employed population is relatively small—around 40%.
13The share of immigrants varies between less than 1% in Japan and 32% in Canada.
14Japan, Finland, and Sweden have the highest share of the oldest age group
(more than 20%), but in these countries, the oldest age groups have relatively high
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scores. On the other hand, Austria, Ireland, Italy, and France have small shares of
the oldest age groups, but these countries do not have high average scores.
15Wage and salary earners could choose among reporting their earnings per hour,
day, week, 2 weeks, month, or year or by piece rate. There was also an option for re-
spondents to report their earnings in broad categories which was especially attractive
for those who knew only roughly how much they earn. These novelties improved the
data quality and willingness to report earnings (for more details, see OECD 2013a, b).
16Certainly the most widely used measure of skill in human capital literature is years
of schooling. Years of schooling are easy to measure, and they are easily available for
researchers. For a long time, this was probably the only measure of skills, since inter-
national comparative surveys of skills were first done in the 1990s.
17In the pooled sample, coefficient of variation does not seem to vary between men,
women, immigrants, and non-immigrants. However, wage dispersion is the highest in
the youngest and oldest age subgroup, and it is decreasing with the decrease of the
age in the rest of the groups. The same is true for D9/D5 and D5/D1. Additionally,
D5/D1 is slightly higher for men and immigrants than for women and non-
immigrants.
18Additional analysis shows that there is no difference in the correlation coefficient
between gender, age, and (non-) immigrant subgroups. The correlation coefficient in all
the subgroups varies between 0.41 and 0.48 in the pooled sample.
19France, Italy, and Spain have the highest dispersion of years of schooling mainly
due to the high dispersion in the bottom half of the distribution (comparative to the
other countries). These three countries have the highest shares of employed persons
with the lowest number of years of schooling (5 or 6) in the overall employed popula-
tion—France (almost 14%), Italy (5%), and Spain (14%). Moreover, France and Italy are
the only two countries in the sample in which there are people that acquired 5 years of
schooling only.
20Decile is any of the nine values that divides the sorted data into ten equal parts so
that each part represents 1/10 of the sample or population. The decile ratio is an indi-
cator of dispersion; it is calculated by dividing the ratio of the 9/5th decile by the 5th/
1st decile of skill scores and hourly earnings of an employed person.
21Wage and skill inequality measured by D9/D1, Gini coefficient, and Theil index also
show that there is no strong relation. Their correlation coefficients are 0.09, 0.05, and
0.02, respectively.
22Hanushek et al. (2014) examined return to skills based on the PIAAC data set and
found significant heterogeneity between the countries. Returns to skills (associated with
a one-standard-deviation increase in measured numeracy test scores) vary between 12
and 15% in Nordic countries and 28% in the USA. Furthermore, returns to skill are
lower in countries with higher union density, stricter employment protection, and
a larger public sector.
23It could also be that schooling reflects wider range of skills, but this analysis is
limited to numeracy skills only.
24L1—lower secondary or less; L2—upper secondary; L3—post-secondary, non-
tertiary; L4—tertiary professional; L5—tertiary bachelor; L6—tertiary master degree
25The employment to population rate refers to the percentage share of employed
persons in the total working age population.
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26The only correlation that is of weak significance (at only a 10% significance level) is
the one between hours worked per head and wage inequality at the upper part of the
distribution. More hours worked are related to higher wage inequalities at the top.
27Analysis shows that there is no correlation between the relative deviation of scores
between the employed and the unemployed and the wage dispersion in the low-skilled
sector (D5/D1), which is not in line with the wage compression hypothesis.
28Surely, there will always be some frictional unemployment, but it exists in all skill
groups.
29All tables and graphs are available upon request.
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